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Obesity Prevention: Assessing the Role of State and
Non-State Actors under International Law
Anna K. Sims*
Abstract
Obesity is a global epidemic affecting both the developed and developing world.
Governments have instituted different polig measures to counter their citizens' increasing
weight, and these measures are often incompatible with the international trade laws protected by
the World Trade Organization. Scholars have tried to interpret the various international trade
law treaties in ways that would legitimize those diet-related policies that are in tension with the
international trade regime. Such efforts, though, are misdirected because of theirpotential to be
ineffective and regressive. Instead, this Comment will propose that non-state actors that baveprospered within the global free trade gvstem-speci/icaly cororations, such as Wal-Mart
whose revenues rival the GDP of many nalions-may be best situated to help counteract the
obesioy epidemic.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Globally, the number of obese people is approaching the number of
undernourished people.' While commentators have blamed a number of factors
for this trend, a particularly salient one is trade liberalization. Scholars have
argued that trade liberalization affects the availability of certain foods because it
removes barriers to foreign investment in food distribution.2 In response,
governments have implemented a variety of policy measures to correct for their
populations' growing waistlines. These measures are sometimes incongruous
with the international trade laws safeguarded by the World Trade Organization
(WTO), and as a result, countries may abandon or soften them so as to avoid
sanctions or retaliation. These instances of incongruence suggest a degree of
tension between the international trade regime and certain, although not all,
government efforts to change unhealthy diet patterns.
In response, scholars have tried to interpret the various international trade
law treaties in ways that would legitimize those diet-related policies that are in
tension with the international trade regime.' This Comment, though, will argue
that the potential for these efforts to be ineffective and regressive demands that
scholars and policymakers focus their efforts to alleviate "globesity" elsewhere-
namely, on non-state actors, specifically corporations, that have particularly
thrived within the global free trade system.4 This Comment posits that
international human rights law should be understood as recognizing corporate
responsibilities to address distributive barriers to healthy eating.
The sections below proceed as follows. Section II discusses global trends
and provides background information regarding weight and diet. Section III
argues that trade liberalization has contributed to the world's growing waistlines.
Section IV discusses international efforts to fight obesity, and Section V then
examines four different policy tools under WTO law that national governments
S ee ROBERT L. PAARI.BERG, FOOD POLITICS: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 220 (2d ed.
2013) (observing that the total number of obese adults and children approaches the 2008 UN
Food and Agriculture Organization estimate of the number of undernourished individuals, which
was 876 million).
2 See, for example, Chantal Blouin et al., Trade and Sodal Determinants of Health, 373 LANCET 502, 502-
07 (2009).
3 See, for example, BENN McGRADY, TRADE AND PUBLIC HEALTH: THE WTO, TOBACCO, ALCOHOl.,
AND DIET 84-87 (2011); W. Philip T. James et al., Food Imports and Dietay Change: A Persectivefrom
Thailand, in TRADE, FOOD, DIET AND HEALTH 169,184 (Corinna Hawkes et al. eds., 2010).
4 Vincent Trivett, 25 U.S. Mega Corporations: Where Thy Rank If They Were Countries, BUSINESS
INSIDER (June 27, 2011, 11:27 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/25-corporations-bigger-
tan-countries-2011-6.
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have employed to combat obesity. Section VI questions the desirability of some
of these state policies in terms of their efficacy and distributive effects.
Section VII posits that, instead of trying to legitimize these state policy tools,
efforts should be redirected to trying to strengthen the normative expectations
on corporate non-state actors to address obesity associated with poverty. This
section advocates for the "Wal-Mart Solution" before Section VIII offers
concluding remarks.
II. "GLOBESITY" IS ON THE RISE
The worldwide prevalence of overweight and obese individuals shot up by
27.5 percent among adults and 47.1 percent among children between 1980 and
2013. The number of overweight and obese individuals increased from 857
million to 2.1 billion from 1980 to 2013. 6 Childhood obesity is also up from 5
percent in 1980 to 17 percent in 2013. 7 As of 2014, there were around 805
million individuals who were undernourished around the world,8 but also 600
million individuals who were obese.9 As one scholar has noted, "[t]he problem
of hunger that previously monopolized political attention is now sharing the
stage with this new and rapidly growing problem of excessive food
consumption."' 0
Over 50 percent of the 672 million obese people in the world live in the
following ten countries, listed in order of numerosity: the U.S., China, India,
Russia, Brazil, Mexico, Egypt, Germany, Pakistan, and Indonesia.11 In 2013, 31.6
percent of U.S. men and 33.9 percent of U.S. women were obese, accounting for
13 percent of the world's obese population.' 2 China and India jointly account for
15 percent, and 62 percent of the world's obese population live in developing
countries.13 As the U.N. Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) has
observed, "[i]t is a bitter irony that as developing countries continue their efforts
5 Marie Ng et al., Global, Regional, and National Prevalence of Overweight and Obesiy in Children and Adults
During 1980-2013: A Systematic Analysis for the Global Burden of Disease Study 2013, 384 LANCET 766,
770 (2014).
6 See id.
7 PAARLBERG, supra note 1, at 82.
8 The FAO Hunger Map 2014, supra note 1.
9 Fact sheet No. 311, supra note 1.
10 PAARLBRG, supra note 1, at 81.
1 See Ng et al., supra note 5, at 777.
12 Id.
13 Id.
Vol. 16 No. 1
Obesity Prevention
to reduce hunger, some are also facing the opposing problem of obesity."14
Even sub-Saharan Africa, where hunger is most prevalent, has been experiencing
a rise in obesity."5 In some countries like Brazil and Mexico, obesity is ceasing to
be associated with relatively high economic status and is becoming a marker of
poverty (as in developed countries). 6
The medical and public health community generally discusses these
numbers with alarm. According to the World Health Organization (WHO),
approximately 3.4 million adults die annually as a result of being overweight or
obese." Additionally, 44 percent of the "diabetes burden," 23 percent of the
"ischaemic heart disease burden," and between 7 percent and 41 percent of
certain "cancer burdens" are attributable to being significantly overweight. 8
While the causal relationship between obesity itself and these outcomes is hotly
debated, studies generally show that "consistent risks" for these diseases increase
as BMI increases.19  Research in this area often focuses on resource
consumption, and studies frequently discuss weight in terms of the burden
placed on domestic health systems. One study even has claimed that the U.S.
devoted 20.6 percent of its health expenditures to treating obesity-related
illness.2a In sum, the public health community undoubtedly views obesity as
taking a real toll on an individual's health.
III. INTERNATIONAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION Is FATTENING
US UP
Scholars have posited a number of factors for why the world's population
is getting fatter. Most directly, excess calorie consumption is the culprit. The
modern obesity epidemic is the result of excess calorie consumption and
decreased movement. 21 Genetics provides part of the explanation, "but it
cannot explain the rapid increase that we have seen in prevalence across
14 The Developing World's New Burden: Obesi(7 (2002), FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL. ORGANIZATION OF
THE UNITED NATIONS, available at http://www.fao.org/focus/e/obesity/obesl.htm.
15 See id.
16 See Mickey Chopra et al., A Global Response to a Global Probkm: The Epidemic of Overnutrition, 80
Buil . WOVwD HEALTH ORG. 952, 953 (2002).
17 Fact sheet No. 311, supra note 1.
18 Id.
19 Ng et al., supra note 5, at 779.
20 See John Cawley & Chad Meyerhoefer, The Medical Care Costs of Obesio: An Instrumental Varidables
Approach, 31 J. HEALTH ECON. 219, 227 (2012).
21 See PAARLBERG, supra note 1, at 84.
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generations, because human genetics does not change that fast. ' 22 Between 1970
and 2003, average daily caloric intake increased to a point 20 percent more than
the WHO recommends, while average muscular exertion declined.
23
While there are a number of different factors scholars and public health
experts identify as contributing to our increased calorie intake, the most crucial
is international trade liberalization because of its multifold and dynamic effect on
food distribution. Scholars often posit that there is a "relationship between trade
liberalization and increasing levels of obesity. ' 24 Notably, countries like Japan,
Norway, and South Korea that have maintained higher import tariffs have
relatively lower levels of obesity compared to more liberalized countries such as
the U.S. or Australia. 5 Scholars have observed that trade liberalization decreases
the relative cost of dietary energy because it leads to the increased global trade in
energy-dense foods such as refined grains, corn sweeteners, and vegetable oils. 26
As a result, energy-dense foods using these inputs tend to cost less than
nutrient-dense foods, and these relative price differences, in turn, shape
consumption patterns, especially among the poor.27
Chantal Blouin, a Canadian global health expert, and others have
highlighted the relationship between trade liberalization, foreign investment, and
obesity.2 She suggests that through removing barriers to foreign investment in
food distribution, trade liberalization affects food availability: "Evidence
suggests penetration of supermarkets into various food retail markets of
southern Africa, Latin America, and China. Transformation of food retail has
facilitated a pronounced shift to consumption of processed food. 2 9
Additionally, the removal of such investment barriers increases investment in
and the proliferation of multinational fast-food restaurants in middle-income
countries.30  And after foreign direct investment by multinational food
companies, the availability of processed foods in developing countries also
22 Id.
23 See id.
24 McGRADY, supra note 3, at 5.
25 See Blouin et al., supra note 2, at 505.
26 See Adam Drewnowski et al., International Trade, Food and Diet Costs, and the Global Obesiy Epidemic,
in TRADE, FOOD, DIET AND HEALTH 77,77-80 (Hawkes et al. eds., 2010).
27 See id. at 88-89.
28 Blouin et al., supra note 2, at 504-05. See also John Kearney, Food Consumption Trend and Drivers, 365
PHIL. TRANS. ROYAL SoC'y B 2793 (2010).
29 Blouin et al., supra note 2, at 504-05.
30 See id.
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increases.3 This influx of cheap, processed food shifts consumption habits away
from traditional diets based on domestically produced food products to largely
imported "energy dense, nutrient poor foods that are high in fat, sugar and
salt."32 Moreover, the "[i]ntroduction of foreign capital and competition has also
boosted investments in marketing and advertising," which have facilitated sales
of "highly processed foods in nations of middle and low income."33
These general phenomena are reflected in research showing that trade
liberalization is "a significant driver" of the noncommunicable disease epidemic
in Asia. 34 From 1999 to 2013, China saw a 3.2-fold consumption increase in
processed food, and Vietnam saw a 3.6-fold increase. 3' These scholars suggest
that the "evolving layers of the international and regional trade regimes have
facilitated increased market penetration" by processed food as well as tobacco
and alcohol corporations, which have led to increased consumption of such
"risk commodities in Asia." 36 These scholars offer similar reasons regarding
decreased barriers to exports and imports and increased foreign direct interest,
but they also posit that "through reducing tariff revenues and imposing
significant costs associated with compliance and negotiation, trade agreements
can indirectly impact health by reducing the resources available to governments
used to fund policy development and implementation." " Moreover, as will be
discussed later, becoming a member of the WTO and complying with its laws
and regulations inherently limits a state's freedom to implement policies
regarding the health of its citizens.
38
Corinna Hawkes, a global food policy expert, has synthesized the
relationship between trade liberalization and changing dietary patterns. She
posits that "trade iberalisation affects the whole food supply chain by
31 See id. ("For example, U.S. investment in foreign food-processing companies grew from
U.S.$9000 million in 1980 to U.S.$36000 million in 2000, with sales increasing from U.S.$39200
million in 1982 to U.S.$150000 million in 2000.").
32 MCGRADY, supra note 3, at 17 (quoting World Health Organization, Global Strategy on Diet,
WHA57.17, 10). See also Tereso S. Tullao, The Impact of Economic Globalization on Noncommunicable
Diseases: Opportunities and Threats, in WHO, GiOBAI.IZATION, DIETS, AND NONCOMMUNICABLE.
DISEASES 19 (2002).
33 Blouin et al., supra note 2, at 505.
34 See Philip Baker et al., Trade and Investment Liberalization and Asia's Noncommunicable Disease Epidemic:
A Synthesis of Data and Existing Literature, 10(66) GLOBALIZATION AND HEALTH 1, 1 (Aug. 25,
2014), available at http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/10/1/66.
35 See id. at 7.
36 Id. at 16.
37 Id. at 8.
38 See id.
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influencing the incentives farmers and agribusinesses have to produce different
foods; food imports and exports (very directly); and food processing, retailing,
and advertising, which have all been profoundly affected by the growth of global
food companies."39 As such, it seems that trade liberalization is at least highly
correlative to the rise of obesity and at most a large contributing factor.
IV. INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO COMBAT OBESITY
ARE TOOTHLESS
In 2004, the WHO developed its Global Strategy on Diet, Physical Activity
and Health after the World Health Assembly authorized the WHO to address
the prevalence of non-communicable diseases related to unhealthy diets and
physical inactivity.4" The Global Strategy functions as a non-binding blueprint of
suggested policy mechanisms that countries can employ to combat obesity
within their jurisdictions, and it also includes recommendations for non-state
actors.4'
The Global Strategy addresses both state and non-state actors. It
specifically recommends that governments reexamine their agricultural policies42
and advertising regulations; 43 use fiscal policies to influence the availability of
and access to food;' craft school policies and programs that support healthy
diets and exercise; 45 and implement measures to incentivize the reduction of salt,
hydrogenated oils, and sugar in processed foods. 6 In tandem, the Global
Strategy recommends that the food industry specifically work to limit the level of
saturated fats, trans-fatty acids, free sugars, and salt in existing products and
"continue to develop and provide affordable, healthy and nutritious choices to
consumers." 47 Moreover, the Global Strategy recommends that the private
39 Corinna Hawkes, The Influence of Trade Liberalisation and Global Dietay Change: The Case of Vegetable
Oils, Meat and Highly Processed Foods, in TRADE, FOOD, DIET AND HEALTH 35, 36 (Hawkes et al.
eds., 2010).
40 See World Health Organization, Global Strategy on Diet, PhysicalActivioy and Health (2004), available at
http://www.who.int/dietphysicalactivity/strategy/ebl 1344/strategy-english web.pdf
[hereinafter "Global Strategy"].
41 See id.
42 See id. art. 41.4.
43 See id. art. 40.3.
44 See id. art. 41.2.
45 See id. art. 43.
46 See id. art. 41.1.
47 Id. art. 61.
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sector engage in "responsible marketing," issue clear, evidence-based labels, and
assist in developing physical activity programs.48
The WHO's role in realizing the Global Strategy is limited, though.
Member States are responsible for choosing and implementing their own
policies and programming, and the WHO only provides technical support upon
request.4 9 Because the Strategy is non-binding, the voluntary initiative of
Member States, therefore, is the primary vehicle for realizing the Global
Strategy. As one scholar has noted, "even if countries are willing to implement
the recommendations outlined in the Global Strategy, the practical force of
domestic rules or regulations is weak without the backing of an international
body ready to enforce, interpret, and provoke Member Nations into following
through with their commitments."5
Additionally, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the
Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health
released a recent report on unhealthy foods and non-communicable diseases.5 '
Among its recommendations, the document calls on states to make healthy food
more affordable 2 and on the food industry to focus on steps such as improving
the nutritional content of unhealthy food. 3 Special rapporteurs have limited
power, though. They can only (1) examine, monitor, advise, and publicly report
on human right situations; (2) send letters transmitting allegations to states or
communications requesting state action to protect rights; and (3) carry out
country visits to examine implementation, report findings, and make
recommendations.5 4 Because enforcement at the international level is so weak,
compliance is largely brought about through public shaming or fear of
48 Id
49 Frequently Asked Questions about the WHO Global Strategy on Diet, PhysicalActivioy and Health, WORLD
HEAITH ORGANIZATION, available at http://www.who.int/dietphysicalactivity/faq/en/print.html
(last visited Feb. 3, 2015).
50 Emily Lee, The World Health Organi ation's Global Strategy on Diet, PhysicalActivio, and Health: Turning
Strategy into Action, 60 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 569, 580 (2005).
51 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest
Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, Unhealthy Foods, Non-Communicable
Diseases and the Right to Health, Human Rights Council 26th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/26/31
(Apr. 1, 2014) (by Anand Grover).
52 See id. at 9 ("Reducing the price of nutritious foods to levels cheaper than or comparable to
unhealthy foods would make healthy foods more affordable.").
53 See id. at 66(c) ("Special Rapporteur recommends that the food industry ... [i]nvest[s] in
improving the nutritional content of unhealthy foods.").
54 See U.N. Special Procedures, Facts and Figures 2008, available at http://www.ohchr.org/
Documents/ H RBodies/SP/factsfigures2008.pdf.
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reputational harm."5 Given that the WHO cannot enforce its recommended
policies, improving global obesity prevention requires an examination of state-
driven counter-obesity policies.
V. THE DOMESTIC TOOLBOX TO FIGHT THE FLAB IS LIMITED
BY WTO LAW
This section will discuss four different policy tools that national
governments have employed in order to combat obesity and examine them
under WTO law: (1) import restrictions, (2) labeling regimes, (3) "fat" taxes, and
(4) subsidies to encourage healthful eating. The purpose of these case studies is
to illustrate the compatibility of the international trade regime and these
government policies.5 6 Each measure discussed falls into the scope of a different
treaty. The section on import restrictions focuses on the Agreement on
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary v Measures (SPS); the section on
labeling implicates the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT); the
section on taxes discusses Article 111.2 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT); and the section on food benefits examines the Agreement on
Agriculture.
It is important to note, though, that while this Comment will focus on
these more specific treaties, Member States could theoretically justify an anti-
obesity measure by invoking GATT Article XX(b), which carves out an
exception to the general requirements in the GATT for measures that are
"necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health."5 8 To date, only the
55 See Yvonne Dutton, Commitment to International Human Rights Treaties: The Role of Enforcement
Mechanisms, 34 U. PA.J. INT'l, L. 1, 31 (2013).
56 This part of the discussion will only focus on government mechanisms and not private industry
action. For example, industry groups commonly take voluntary public pledges to commit to
promoting healthful diets. For instance, the International Food and Beverage Alliance (IFBA)
recently announced its "Global Policy on Advertising and Marketing Communications to
Children," which created a non-binding voluntary commitment not to advertise their products to
children under 12 years of age. See Global Polig on Advertising and Marketing Communications to
Children, INTERNATIONAL. FOOD & BEVERAGE ALLIANCE, (Nov. 2011), available at
https://www.ifbafiance.org/sites/default/files/FBA%20Global %2OPolicy/ 20on%2OAdvertisi
ng%20and%20Marketing%20Communications%20to%20Children%28FINAL%2011%202011%
29.pdf.
57 "Sanitary (human and animal health) and phytosanitary (plant health) measures apply to
domestically produced food or local animal and plant diseases, as well as to products coming
from other countries." Understanding the W7FO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitagy Measures (May
1998), available at https://www.wto.org/english/tratope/spse/spsund-e.htm.
58 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, Annex lA, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
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measure at issue in the EC - Asbestos WTO dispute s5 namely a French ban on
asbestos products, has managed to qualify as an Article XX(b) exception.6"
Surviving an Article XX(b) challenge is particularly difficult because, to survive
WTO scrutiny, a state will also have to defend any health-related measure it
implements under the appropriate and more specific provisions of the SPS,
TBT, Article 111:2 of the GAIT, or the Agreement on Agriculture. Therefore,
discussing such provisions, not Article XX(b), suffices to illustrate the
compatibility of the international trade regime with domestic anti-obesity policy
tools.
A. Import Restrictions on Unhealthy Foods or Ingredients
A few countries have tried to implement import bans on unhealthy foods.
In light of its obesity problem, the South Pacific island of Samoa banned the
import of turkey tails and New Zealand mutton flaps in 2007.61 To gain approval
to join the WTO, however, the country had to drop its ban on turkey tails.62
Within the accession agreement, Samoa was allowed to place an import duty of
300 percent for two years, but after those two years, the state could enforce a
100-percent tariff on the tails for a year.63 The time lag was meant to give the
state time "to develop and implement a nation-wide programme promoting
healthier diet and life style choices."64
It would be easy to argue that this example suggests prima faie that the
WTO is hostile to health-related measures that restrict forms of trade. The issue,
however, is not that simple, because the Samoan example does not answer
whether a country could craft a more WTO-friendly import ban on certain
"unhealthy" or "junk" foods. Scholars have argued that a country could ban the
ROUND OF MULTIIATE'RAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 17 (1999), 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 IL.M. 1153
(1994) [hereinafter GATT.
59 Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing
Products, VT/DS135/AB/R, (adopted Apr. 5, 2001), DSR 2001:VI1, 3243.
60 See id. at IX(1)(0.
61 See Eliza Barclay, Samoans Await the Return of the Tasy Turkey Tail, NPR (May 9, 2013), available at
http://www.npr.org/blogs/thesalt/201 3/05/14/182568333/samoans-await-the-return-of-the-
tasty-turkey-tail. "According to a 2010 report from the Samoa Minister of Health, 53 percent of
Samoans are obese." Id.
62 See World Trade Organization, Briefing Note: Samoa's Accession to the \VTO, Oct. 2011, available
at http: / /www.wto.org/ english / thewto-e/ minist-e/ min l _e/briefsamoae.htm.
63 See id.
64 Id.
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import of excessively sugary or fatty foods as a legally valid safety measure
protected under the SPS Agreement.65 If this option were viable, it might be of
particular interest to countries in the beginning or in the midst of trade
liberalization, because opening up markets to the import of foreign processed
foods appears to correlate with increasing obesity rates.66 Government officials
in Samoa specifically noted that before the arrival of foreign foods, few people
were obese.67 The followings subsections explain the applicable SPS provisions
and the viability of a safety-based import ban on "junk" foods.
1. The SPS Agreement.
In the context of food, the SPS agreement is implicated if a Member
Nation has advanced a measure relating to food safety.68 The most relevant
provision is Annex A(b), which defines a sanitary or phytosanitary measure as
any measure applied "to protect human or animal life or health within the
territory of the Member from risks arising from additives, contaminants, toxins
or disease-causing organisms in foods, beverages, or feedstuffs."69 A food safety
measure under Article 2 is illegal, regardless of whether it treats imported and
domestic products differently, if it is maintained "without sufficient scientific
evidence."7 These measures must not be "more trade-restrictive than required
to achieve their appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection, taking
into account technical and economic feasibility."
7 1
In applying the SPS, WTO panels rely on standards set by the Codex
Alimentarius Commission (Codex): a national health standard is presumptively
legal if it conforms to a standard, guideline, or recommendation set by the
Codex.72 When a national standard is more stringent than the Codex, the
standard is presumptively illegal unless the panel decides that an appropriate
"risk assessment" has been conducted under Article 5 and that there is a
65 See, for example, James et al., supra note 3, at 184.
66 See Anne Marie Thow, Trade Liberalisalion and the Nutrition Transition: Mapping the Pathways for Public
Health Nutriionists, 12 PUB. HEALTH NUTRITION 2150, 2150-58 (2009).
67 See Barclay, supra note 61.
68 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures of the World Trade
Organization (1994), art. II, 1 (1995), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/sps-e/
spsagr-e.htm [hereinafter SPS Agreement].
69 Id. Annex A(b).
70 Id. art. 2.
71 Id. art. 5.6.
72 Id art. 3.2.
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"scientific justification" that the Codex standard, guideline, or recommendation
is "not sufficient to achieve its appropriate level" of protection. 3
2. Import restrictions on unhealthy food based on food safety.
The Codex does not officially recognize fat, sugar, or salt as additives or
toxins, but there is an argument to be made that the terms "additives" and
"toxins" extend the scope of the SPS to such nutrients. It might seem plausible
to argue that the sugar, fat, and salt found in processed foods, for instance,
should be described as "additives"; 4 however, the Codex defines "food
additive" to mean a substance "not normally used as a typical ingredient" in
food." This definition would seem to exclude characterizing salt, sugar, or fat as
additives-even in the context of processed foods-because they are typical
ingredients normally included in food products.
Others like Philip James, British chairman of the International Obesity
Taskforce, have argued for the characterization of these ingredients as toxins:
[it could be argued that saturated fats, sugars or salt have many features
analogous to classic toxicants, in that repeated exposure of the population
to appreciable amounts of these foods would induce the population risk
factors to rise (e.g. raise blood cholesterol, weight gain and increases in
hypertension). In that sense, saturated fats are just as damaging, if not more
harmful on a population basis, as the steady consumption of modest
amounts of a heavy metal. 76
Even if this argument seems attractive, the case law may limit its viability.
In EC-Biotech Products,77 the panel drew a distinction between foods that pose a
danger to the life or health of a consumer and foods that are "nutritionally
disadvantageous for the consumer if it does not provide the body with nutrients
in the right quantity or of the right quality." 78 In the context of genetically
modified organisms (GMOs), the panel in EC-Biotech Products recognized that a
consumer who normally drinks orange juice as an important source of vitamin C
might become nutritionally disadvantaged if she began to drink orange juice
73 Id. art. 3.3.
74 See, for example, Roger S. Magnusson, Non-Communicable Disease and Global Health Governance:
Enhancing Global Processes to Improve Health Development, 3 Gi.OBALIZATION & HEALTH (2007).
75 Codex General Standard for the Labeling of Prepackaged Food, CODEX STAN 1-1985 (Rev. 1-
1991), available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/Y2770E/y2770eO2.htm [hereinafter Codex].
76 James et al., supra note 3, at 184.
77 Panel Report, EC-Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Prods., WT/DS291/R,
WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R (Sept. 29, 2006), 7.413, available at http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop e/dispue/casese/ds291_e.htm.
78 Id.
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made with GMO oranges hypothetically deficient in vitamin C. However, the
panel did not view this issue as falling within the scope of the SPS because the
deficiency could be rectified by consuming vitamin C from other sources.7 9
The panel's vitamin C hypothetical highlights how the WTO is likely to
view James's argument: through the lens of consumer choice. Because the
consumer can correct his vitamin C deficiency through consuming other
products rich in vitamin C, such a product stands outside the scope of the SPS.
In the context of "junk" foods, these same consumers can correct the nutrient
deficiencies resulting from eating a bag of chips by choosing something with
higher nutritional value. James's argument assumes that the SPS should apply
given the adverse long-term effects of sugar, fat, and salt consumption; however,
given the panel's reasoning in EC-Biotech Products, the WTO seems disinclined to
assume away consumers' ability to correct for disadvantageous nutritional
outcomes.
B. Nutrition Labeling
Another common diet-related national measure is nutrition labeling. In
1994, the U.S. became the first government to require that all processed food
provide a nutritional disclosure panel."0 The Codex guidelines specifically
mandate nutrient declarations.8 Some countries, however, have pioneered more
creative labeling requirements in an effort to curb obesity and incentivize healthy
choices. Chile has proposed placing "STOP" signs on "junk food" in response
to the country's obesity problem, which particularly plagues youth, and claimed
that "the measure [is] necessary to provide easily understandable warnings on
products." 2 Likewise the U.K., which suffers from one of the highest obesity
rates in the world, has implemented a voluntary traffic-light scheme that depicts
specific nutrient levels of a food as green, amber, or red.83 While neither schema
has yet been challenged at the WTO, to understand how the Chilean and the
79 See id.
80 Nutrition Labeling and Education Act (NLEA) Requirements, Guide to Nutrition Labeling and
Education Act (Feb. 1995), available at http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/Inspections/Inspection
Guides/ucm074948.htm.
81 See Codex, supra note 75, 4.1.1.
82 Members Discuss Guidelines for Trade-Fnendy Regulation and STOP Sign for 'Junk Food," WTO NEWS
ITEMS (March 13, 2013), available at https://www.wto.org/english/news-e/news13_e/
tbt_13mar13_e.htm [hereinafter "Junk Food" Sign].
83 Martin Hole et al., The Compatibiliy of National Inteqpretative Nutrition Labelling Schemes bith European
and InternationalLan', 9 EUR. FOOD & FElED L. REv. 148, 150 (2014).
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U.K. programs are likely to hold up under WTO scrutiny, it is important to
consider the relevant sections of the TBT.
1. The TBT Agreement.
The relevant definitions in the TBT regard technical regulations and
standards. A technical regulation is defined as a document that lays down
product characteristics or their related processes and production methods,
compliance with which is mandatory.84 With standards, on the other hand,
compliance is not mandatory.85 Standards are approved by recognized bodies
and provide rules, guidelines, or characteristics for products or processes and
production methods.86
If a panel finds a given regulation to be a standard, then the Member State
faces less stringent obligations because, under Article 4 of the TBT, Members
"shall ensure that their central government standardizing bodies [... ] accept and
comply with the Code of Good Practice for the Preparation, Adoption and
Application of Standards in Annex 3 to this Agreement."8 " Under the Code of
Good Practice, Member States must (1) not discriminate against imported like
products; (2) not prepare, adopt, or apply standards with a "view to, or with the
effect of, creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade;" and (3) adopt
international standards where they exist.88 Whereas if the panel finds the
regulation to be a technical regulation, then the labeling scheme is subject to the
stricter requirements of Article 2.1, which articulates a no-less-favorable
treatment standard, and Article 2.2, which imposes an additional requirement
that the measure "shall not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfill a
legitimate objective, taking account of the risks non-fulfillment would create."89
Among the legitimate objectives listed in Article 2.2 is the "protection of human
health or safety."'90
84 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round
(Apr. 15, 1994), LT/UR/A-1A/10, Annex 1.1, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/
legal-e/17-tbt e.htm [hereinafter TBT Agreement].
85 See id. Annex 1.2.
86 See id. Annex 1.2 and 3(B).
87 Id. art. 4.1.
88 Id. art. 5.1.2.
89 TBT Agreement, supra note 84, art. 2.2.
90 Id.
Summer 2015
Chicago Journal of International Law
When hearing a TBT dispute at the WTO, the adjudicatory panel must first
determine whether the measure constitutes a technical regulation or a standard.91
If entrance into a market were contingent on compliance with a statute regarding
a health label, then there is no doubt that that regulation would be a technical
regulation; however, "[t]he boundaries between the two concepts get blurred
when public bodies adopt measures that establish labeling requirements that a
manufacturer only must observe if he wants to use that specific label on a
voluntary basis."92 Perhaps most importantly, regulations may be challenged "as
such" or "as applied," which means that voluntary labeling on its face can be
considered de facto mandatory.93
2. Mandatory labeling in Chile.
Chile's STOP labeling amendment is designed to deter consumption of
foods high in fat, sugar, and salt by including warnings labels on products
containing high levels of those substances.94 The original amendment proposed
that the STOP icon take up 20 percent of the package, but after TBT
Committee Members voiced concerns, Chile adjusted it to require the icon to
account for 7.5 percent of the total surface of the package.9" After further
complaints about how 80 percent of all prepackaged foods might need the "high
in" icons, Chile narrowed the scope of the food categories to which the icon
would have to be applied.96
Given that this label is mandatory, it must meet the requirements of
Article 2.2 that the measure shall be no more trade-restrictive than necessary to
fulfill a legitimate objective. As the U.S. Trade Representative has argued,
narrowing the scope of food categories raises "questions about the scientific
basis for food category selection., 97 Because the categories appear to be less
scientific and more political, the legitimacy of the objective required by
Article 2.2 comes into question. Moreover, the USTR has specifically argued that
"voluntary labeling schemes could address Chile's stated objective."98 It is
91 See Catherine Button, THE POWER TO PROTECT: TRADE, HEALTH AND UNCERTAINTY IN THE
WTO 81-82 (2004).
92 Holle et al., supra note 83, at 158.
93 See "Junk Food" Sign, supra note 82.
94 U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2014 REPORT ON TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE, at 54, available
at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2014%20TBT°/o20Report.pdf.
95 See id.
96 See id. at 55.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 52.
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plausible that a panel would suggest a series of less trade-restrictive approaches,
including voluntary labeling schemes combined with public health education
campaigns similar to those mandated for Samoa accession to WTO
membership.
3. Voluntary labeling in the U.K.
In 2007, the U.K. Food Standards Agency (FSA) released the first technical
guidance for its traffic-light scheme. The system shows how much fat, saturated
fat, sugar, and salt there is in foods by coding the nutrient as red, amber, or
green according to the relevant percentage of these ingredients in the food.99
The labels are "considered to be semi-directive as they make the nutrient
content of the food transparent but at the same time illustrate whether the
content of a certain nutrient is regarded to be high, medium or low in nutritional
terms."1 ' Companies may voluntarily sign up to participate in the labeling
scheme."1
Technically, this scheme is voluntary, thus bypassing the stricter Article 2
requirements. But as Martin Holle, a German professor of food law and
administrative law, and others argue, "one could easily think that we are dealing
with standards because the U.K. has adopted neither a statute nor a regulation.
However, in the WTO context, a measure must be considered as a whole, and it
can be challenged 'as such' or 'as applied."'"0 2 If it becomes practically
impossible to market a product without the label-if, for instance, citizens
groups and NGOs have been particularly effective at promoting boycotts against
retailers selling products without the government label-then a panel could
consider the measure to be defacto mandatory103
The WTO addressed this issue in the Dolphin Safe labeling dispute. In the
case, the panel found that even though the U.S. did not obligate products to
bear the label, the label was a technical regulation under the TBT.14 While the
Appellate Body found that the label was not more restrictive than necessary to
99 Nick Triggle, Food Labeling: Consistent System to be Rolled Out, BBC (June 19, 2013), availabk at
http://www.bbc.com/news/health-22959239; Holle, supra note 83, at 149.
100 Holle, supra note 83, at 149.
101 See id.
102 Id.
103 Report of the Panel, United States - Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and
Tuna Products, 7.175, WT/DS381/R (Sept. 15, 2011). Affirmed by Appellate Body Report, United
States - Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of 7una and Tuna Products, 407(a),
WT/DS381/AB/R (May 16, 2012) [hereinafter Tuna Products].
104 See id.
Summer 2015
Chicago Journal of International Law
fulfill a legitimate objective of protecting dolphins and informing consumers,105
the label had changed competitive conditions in the U.S. market in such a way
that was disadvantageous to Mexican tuna and thus constituted de facto
discrimination inconsistent with the TBT's no-less-favorable-treatment
provision. "'
The Dolphin Safe case highlights some of the issues that would likely be in
dispute if the U.K. traffic light system were challenged. The U.K. Minister of
Public Health has put pressure on food companies to join the labeling
program,' and although the program has not been challenged yet at the WTO,
if the program were so successful that companies felt they had to participate in it
to enter into the U.K. market, a panel could deem it inconsistent with the TBT
given the defacto market exclusion. Similar to the tuna label, a panel may find that
such a label modifies the competitive conditions in such a way as to be
discriminatory. Ironically, it is only if the label is less successful that it avoids this
issue under WTO law.
C. "Fat" Taxes
Taxing "sinful" features of food is a popular method of trying to shape
consumer consumption patterns. Norway has taxed sugar, chocolate, and sugary
drinks since 1981.18 Hungary passed a tax in 2011 aimed at products high in
sugar, salt, and caffeine and redirected the revenue towards healthcare costs."0 9
Following suit, Denmark implemented a 9 percent tax on foods with a saturated
fat content that exceeds 2.3 percent by weight."0 France increased taxes on soft
drinks in 2012."' Most recently, Mexico enacted a tax on all sugar-sweetened
beverages. 112 Understanding the viability of these types of taxes under WTO law
requires a discussion of Article 111:2 of the GATT.
105 See id. 342.
106 See id. 240. See also TBT Agreement, supra note 84, art. 2.1; Ho~e, supra note 83, at 159.
107 See Holle, supra note 83, at n.77.
108 See Sarah Boseley, Mexico to Tackle Obesiy with Taxes on Junk Food and Sugagy Drinks, THE
GUARDIAN, Nov. 1, 2013, available at
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/01/mexico-obesity-taxes-junk- food- sugary-
drinks-exercise.
109 See Obesity Update 2012, OECD (2012), available at http://www.oecd.org/health/49716427.pdf.
110 Franco Sassi, How U.S. Obesity Cohpares with Other Countries, PUBuc BROADCASTING SERVICE (Apr.
2013), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/how-us-obesity-compares-with-
other-countries/.
111 See id.
112 See Boseley, supra note 108.
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1. Article 111:2 of the GATT.
Dietary taxes can pose GATT problems; when a differential tax favors
domestic over foreign goods, there is an Article 111:2 violation:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the
territory of any other contracting party shall not be subject, directly or
indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess of
those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products. Moreover, no
contracting party shall otherwise apply internal taxes or other internal
charges to imported or domestic products in a manner contrary to the
principles set forth in paragraph 1.113
The first sentence creates a test for when a tax violates the GATT: if (1)
the taxed imported and domestic products are like products, and (2) the
imported products are taxed more than their domestic counterparts." 4 The
adjudicatory panel established by the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO is
supposed to determine "like products" by looking at a few criteria: the
properties, nature, and quality of the products; their end-uses; and consumer
tastes and habits." 5 The second sentence applies where one of these conditions
has not been met."6 The meaning of the second sentence of Article 111:2 is
clarified in paragraph 2 of Ad Article III:
A tax conforming to the requirements of the first sentence of paragraph 2
would be considered to be inconsistent with the provisions of the second
sentence only in cases where competition was involved between, on the one
hand, the taxed product and, on the other hand, a directly competitive or
substitutable product which was not similarly taxed. 117
To understand the relationship between these two sentences and their
application, it is useful to examine the Danish fat tax.
2. The Danish fat tax.
Recall that the Danish tax imposed an excise on products whose saturated
fat content exceeded 2.3 percent by weight."' Alberto Alemanno and Ignacio
Carrefio, two European lawyers and legal scholars, argue that "it seems highly
113 GATT, supra note 58, at art. 111:2.
114 See Alberto Alemanno & Ignacio Carrefio, "Fat Taxes" in Europe-A Legal and PoligAnalysis under
EU and IfTO Law, 2 EUR. FOOD & FEED L. REV. 97, 106 (2013).
115 See Report of the Working Party, Border Tax Adjustments, 18, L/3464 (adopted Dec. 2,1970).
116 Appellate Body Report, Canada-Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, WT/DS31 /AB/R, at 23
(June 30, 1997). See also Alemanno & Carrefio, supra note 114, at 106.
117 Appellate Body Report, Korea-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT DS75/AB/R (Jan. 18, 1999),
Interpretative Note Ad Article III from Annex I.
118 Sassi, supra note 110.
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possible that similar products with minor differences in fat content may be
considered as 'like products' by a WTO panel."" 9 Consequently, it would be
problematic "if the effective burden of the tax would lie predominantly on
imported goods, while the majority of domestically produced like products
contain saturated fat at a level lower than 2.3 percent and are thus exempted
from the tax.' '120 However, given that the Danish tax applies to "the widest list
of food products of 6 large subgroups" and captures substitute or imitation
goods, it would be hard to imagine this issue arising.'
12
Alemanno and Carrefio also examine the Danish tax in light of GATT
Article 111:2's second sentence. The Danish policy taxes a whole chicken, which
has 3.4 percent saturated fat, but exempts the inner fillet, which has 1 percent
saturated fat.122 Even assuming that these two products are directly competitive
or substitute products, Alemanno and Carrefio explain that the tax is unlikely to
violate the second sentence if the tax has not been applied "so as to afford
protection" to domestic products.1 23 Consequently, when compared to import
restrictions and labeling, fat taxes have more latitude under WTO law if levied
for health-related purposes and not for covert protectionist purposes.
D. Subsidies to Encourage Healthy Eating
Some governments have used their domestic food-subsidy programs as a
tool to change their citizen's consumption choices. 124 For instance, Michelle
Obama's "Let's Move!" initiative to stop childhood obesity has modified the
federal assistance meal program for school lunches to make them healthier.
125
Governments often provide direct assistance to low-income individuals to
purchase food items with food stamps or debit cards. In the U.S., the program is
called the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP). About 80
119 Alemanno & Carrefio, supra note 114, at 107.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 See id. at 108.
123 Id. at 107 (internal quotations omitted). Compare with Chile -Alcohol, Appellate Body Report, 3, 80
WT/DS/87/AB/R, WT/DSII0/AB/R (Dec. 13, 1999) (finding that that a tax on alcohol that
was differentiated according to alcohol content burdened imported spirits more heavily than
comparable domestic alcohols).
124 See McGRADY, supra note 3, at 103.
125 See USDA Office of Communications, Healthy Hunger-Free Kids Act (Dec. 2, 2010), available at
http://www.fns.usda.gov/tags/healthy-hunger-free-kids-act-0. [Hereinafter HHFKA].
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percent of the U.S. farm bill actually goes towards food stamps.126 The federal
government has not conditioned SNAP benefits on healthy choices beyond
prohibiting the use of the benefits to purchase alcohol and tobacco.12 The
suitability under WTO law of using such subsidy programs to change food
consumption patterns largely depends upon the Agreement on Agriculture.
1. The Agreement on Agriculture.
Domestic food assistance programs do not generally run into problems
under WTO law because such welfare programs explicitly fall into the "Green
Box" in Annex 2 of the Agreement on Agriculture.128 Green Box measures are
considered to have "no, or minimal distortive effects on trade."' 29 Since these
programs have not required that users buy domestic over foreign products, they
have been viewed largely as non-trade distortive. The Agreement on Agriculture
places no limits on the extent to which a State can implement Green Box
measures.130 Consequently, unlike with some of the other measures discussed,
WTO Members have a large degree of flexibility in utilizing domestic subsidies
to shape consumption patterns of those dependent on the subsidy.
2. Food stamps and incentives for healthy purchases.
Given this wide latitude, it is theoretically possible that a food stamp
program to incentivize healthy food choices could be constructed. Researchers
at the USDA have looked into how such incentives could be structured. For
example,
Based on shopping behavior, a financial incentive could be offered that
would result in SNAP participants receiving a rebate for future healthy
purchases. SNAP shoppers would receive a rebate based on the healthy
choices in their total basket. A percentage threshold of healthy purchases
would be established for earning the rebate. If a certain percentage of the
126 See Brad Plumer, Is It Time for Food Stamps to Come out of the Farm Bill?, WASHINGTON POST ouly 10,
2013) available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/O7/10/is-it-time-
for- food-stamps-to-come-out-of-the-farm-bill/.
127 See SNAP: Frequenty Asked Questions, http://www.snaptohealth.org/snap/snap-frequently-asked-
questions/ (last visited Apr. 28, 2015). SNAP benefits also cannot be used to purchase vitamins
and medicines, foods that will be eaten in the store, or hot foods.
128 Agreement on Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1A, THE LEGAL TiXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 33 (1999), 1867 U.N.T.S. 410.
129 Agriculture: Explanation-Domestic Support, WTO (2015), available at http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop-e/agric-e/ag-intro03_domestic-e.htm.
130 See id.
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shopping trip or basket is composed of healthy items, consumers may
receive an additional discount or a future coupon or rebate.131
This type of incentive structure would not run into problems with WTO
law because it does not require that consumers purchase domestic over foreign
items. As long as the incentive structure were set up in such a way that
consumers were rewarded by purchasing, for example, higher quantities of fruits,
vegetables, and whole grains rather than choosing a specific domestic product
over foreign ones, it should avoid becoming discriminatory.
VI. DOMESTIC EFFORTS TO FIGHT OBESITY CAN BE
INEFFECTIVE AND REGRESSIVE
The prior section illuminated the relationship between the international
trade law regime and government policies meant to promote more healthful
diets. The carve-outs within international trade law for domestic welfare
programs and the degree of latitude given to states to implement taxes suggest
that the relationship is not a completely hostile one. However, WTO law
severely limits the viability of import restrictions and labeling schema to combat
obesity.
Furthermore, because the WTO functions as a "forum to negotiate trade
concerns," countries may abandon certain policy measures even before dispute
settlement.'32 Specifically in the nutrition context, the TBT Committee meetings
at the WTO have functioned as a forum to debate Chile's STOP label.'33 The
concerns raised at these meetings have led Chile to soften its STOP policy by
making the sign smaller and requiring its placement on fewer categories of
food.33 The example functions to demonstrate how even short of formal
litigation, the WTO arguably provides a forum to blunt health-related policy
tools. So while the tension should not be overstated, as it often is, it does exist.
In response to this tension, commentators try to play with the language of
the trade agreement in such a way that would allow government measures to
survive WTO scrutiny. James tried to advance this type of argument in his
proposition that certain nutrient components like sugars, salts, and fats could be
131 F.N.S. NUTRITION AssIsTANci.E PROGRAM REPORT, APPROACHES FOR PROMOTING HEALTHY
FOOD PURCHASES BY SNAP PARTICIPANTS 10 (U.S.D.A July 2014), available at
http:/ /www.fns.usda.gov/sites/default/ files/ICF-IHC -Final-Report-071 4.pdf.
132 Jessica Karbowski, Note, Grocey Store Activism. A IVO Compliant Means to Incentivize Sodal
Responsibility, 49 VA.J. INT'L L. 727, 734 (2009).
133 See "Junk Food" Sign, supra note 82.
134 See TBT Agreement, supra note 84.
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defined as toxins so as to regulate them under the SPS. 35 In the same vein, Benn
McGrady, Director of the O'Neill Institute Initiative on Trade, Investment and
Health at Georgetown University Law Center, suggests that if a government
were able to create a comprehensive diet-related policy that involved a number
of different tools and mechanisms, then it would be more likely to survive WTO
scrutiny." 6 These both are arguments that attempt to solve the trade-versus-
health problem by shoehorning health-related measures into the trade-law
system in such a way as to make them compatible. However, these arguments
make some fundamental assumptions about the effectiveness and desirability of
these measures.
For instance, a nutrition-related labeling policy assumes that there is an
information asymmetry between the consumer and the food supplier. 3 ' This
asymmetry qualifies as a market failure that the government corrects for by
creating information-forcing labeling requirements.138 Whether or not one
believes that government action is justified here in correcting this market failure,
the central assumption is that consumers, when provided information, will
change their purchasing behavior to make better dietary decisions. This
assumption is evidenced in the following statement by the USDA Economic
Research Service: "[A]n intervention policy such as labeling could provide a
mechanism for consumers to make better dietary choices and thus increase their
own and society's welfare." '139 Warning labels in particular increase the costs of
purchasing unhealthy products by imposing a "psychic tax" on consumers "by
provoking negative emotions such as fear, anxiety, or shame." 1"
135 SeeJames et al., supra note 3, at 184; SPS Agreement, supra note 68, Annex A.1(b).
136 See McGRADY, supra note 3, at 162. He argues that the Appellate Body has recognized the limits
of alternative policies within comprehensive regulatory schemas. For instance, in Brail- Retreaded
Tyres, the Appellate Body found that possible alternatives the EC posited to an import ban "must
be viewed in the context of the comprehensive strategy designed by Brazil to deal with waste
tyres." Appellate Body Report, Bra#zjL-Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded l1yres,
WT/DS332/AB/R (Dec. 3, 2007). Substituting one element of this comprehensive policy for
another would weaken the policy by reducing the synergies between its components. McGrady,
supra note 3, at 162. As such, the Appellate Body ruled that the panel did not err in rejecting the
alternatives.
137 See Jayachandran N. Variyam, Nutrition Labelng in the Food-A way-From -Home Sector: An Economic
Assessment, USDA, Economic Research Report No. 4, 5 (Apr. 2015), available at
http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/865902/err4_002.pdf.
138 See Olivier Bonroy, On Labels, Competition and Process Attributes, 6 FARM POL'Y J. 43, 43 (2009). See
also Elise Golan et al., Economics of Food Labeling, 24 J. CONSUMER POI.'Y 117, 117-84 (2001).
139 Variyam, supra note 137, at 6.
140 Gary M. Lucas, Jr., Paternalism and Psycbic I axes: The Government's Use of Negative Emotions to Save Us
from Ourselves, 22 S. CAL. INTERDiSC. L.J. 227, 227 (2013).
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However, labeling is not necessarily an effective policy tool. Professors
Wesley Magat and Kip Viscusi have argued that when people do not read or do
not care about the information on the label, labels are not effective. 41 With
regard to calorie consumption labeling, numerous studies indicate that calorie
labeling has little, if any, effect.142 As Professor Tomas Philipson and Judge
Richard Posner similarly point out, "knowledge of proper diet and the
importance of exercise has risen together with weight, indicating that lack of
knowledge is not the major cause of obesity."' 43 Moreover, efforts like calorie
labeling have been shown to be particularly ineffective among lower-income
obese populations. As a participant in a study looking at the effectiveness of
calorie labeling among poor populations said, "It's just cheap, so I buy it. I'm
looking for the cheapest meal I can.""'
Beyond ineffectiveness, labeling may actually have a regressive effect that
tends to hurt poorer populations. Elise Golan, Director for Sustainable
Development for USDA, and others have argued that some of the industry costs
of labeling will probably be passed onto consumers in higher prices."' As a
result, what scholars have called a "reverse Robin Hood effect" occurs in which
poorer individuals are forced to pay for labels that they do not necessarily
value. 1
46
The same conclusions can be drawn in the context of taxes. Even if the
trade regime seems friendly to nutrition-related tax policies, experience has
proven such taxes to be untenable politically. The Danish government had to
repeal its tax one year after enactment due to its unpopularity and
14 See id. See also, generally WESLEY MAGAT & W. KIP VISCUSI, INFORMATIONAL APPROACHES TO
REGULATION (1992); Omri Ben-Shahar, The Myth of the "Opportunioy to Read" in Contract Law, 5
EUR. REV. CONT. L. 1 (2009).
142 Seefor example, Charles Platkin et al., The Effect of Menu Labeling with Calories and Exercise Equivalents
on Food Selection and Consumption, 1 BMC OBESITY (2014), available at http://
www.biomedcentral.com/content/pdf/s40 608-014-0021-5.pdf; Brenna Ellison et al., The Effect of
Calorie Labels on Caloric Intake and Restaurant Revenue: Evidence from Two Full-Service Restaurants, 46 J.
AGRIC. & APPLIED EcON. 173, 173-91 (2014).
143 Tomas Philipson & Richard Posner, Fat New World, WALL STREETJOURNAL (uly 2010), available
at http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703940904575395513421527100.
'44 Anemona Hartocollis, Calorie Postings Don't Change Habits, Study Finds, NEW YORK TIMES (Oct. 6,
2009), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/06/nyregion/06calories.html?r=O.
145 See Golan et al., supra note 138, at 128.
146 Id. at 148.
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ineffectiveness.'47 Danes actually avoided the tax by purchasing butter and
cheese from across the border in Germany.148 Moreover, fat taxes also may be
regressive. Some economists have estimated that a 10 percent tax on fat would
fall almost entirely on poor consumers and that the welfare loss for families
earning $20,000 is almost double that of a family earning $100,000.'9 Specifically
in the debate over soda taxes in the U.S., the argument has been made that such
a tax theoretically would cut soda consumption by the poor who cannot afford
the item after the tax but leave "rich people free to continue guzzling their Dr.
Pepper." '
Given these doubts about how effective and regressive certain national-
level tools may be, it seems counterproductive to propose interpretations of the
international trade law treaties that would allow panels to make more frequent
determinations of regulatory legitimacy. Additionally, given that the WTO is
receptive to domestic welfare programs like food stamps and that the USDA is
looking into ways to use such programs to incentivize healthier choices,"' there
is little innovative that can be said regarding such mechanisms. Instead of trying
to legitimize certain government diet-related policies under existing multilateral
treaties or proposing an ideal government food stamp program, this Comment
argues that certain non-state actors that have particularly thrived as a result of
the global trade regime have a vital and legally cognizable role to play in
addressing the globesity problem.
VII. ADDRESSING GLOBESITY REQUIRES IMPOSING LEGAL
OBLIGATIONS ON NON-STATE ACTORS THAT HAVE
THRIVED WITHIN THE GLOBAL FREE TRADE SYSTEM
Even though the multilateral trade agreements discussed above are the
products of state action and primarily bind state actors, these laws are influenced
by non-state actors. The legitimacy of a state's regulatory policy under WTO law
dictates how non-state actors can behave. Assuming that the size of an
economic entity correlates with how much influence it has over the global trade
147 See Denmark's Food Taxes: A Fat Cbance, THIE ECONOMIST (Nov. 17, 2012), available at
http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21566664-danish-government-rescinds-its-unwieldy-
fat-tax-fat-chance.
148 See id
149 Hayley Chouinard et al., Fat Taxes. Big Monyfor Small Change, 10 F. FOR HEALTH ECON. & POL'Y
1, 17 (2007), available at http:// faculty.ses.wsu.edu/LaFrance/reprints/CDLP-BEP-2007.pdf.
150 Joseph Thorndike, When Will the Soda Tax Go Flat? FORBES (July 9, 2014), available at
http://www.forbes.com/sites/taxanalysts/2014/07/09/when-will-the-soda-tax-go flat/.
151 See HHFKA, supra note 125.
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agenda, the most influential actors outside of states are corporations. In 2010,
there were 25 major U.S. corporations whose revenues surpassed the GDP of
entire countries." 2 Nike's revenues in 2010 would rank it as the 102nd largest
country in terms of GDP, coming in just below Paraguay.153 Berkshire Hathaway
would rank 57th, placing it above Hungary, and Wal-Mart would rank 25th
(above Norway)."5 4 In 2012, Wal-Mart alone was responsible for more than $18
billion in exports from China, which would make it China's sixth-largest export
market if it were a state.' Because of statistics like these, scholars have argued
that not only are multinational entities responsible for the liberalization of
international markets, but they are the "engine[s] of international trade"; indeed,
"it might be said that the WTO is all about multinational corporations." 15 6
Multinational corporations are often considered to represent all that is
wrong with trade liberalization. Wal-Mart-arguably "the most significant
corporate player"1 5T-is a particular target of criticism. The term "Wal-Mart
Effect," which is not a completely pejorative term, refers, in part, to the
economic effects attributable to the Wal-Mart retail chain, including local effects
such as "forcing smaller competitors out of business and driving down
wages. '  Moreover, as with other multinational corporations, Wal-Mart has
been accused of various human rights abuses. In 2007, Human Rights Watch
accused Wal-Mart of going to unethical extremes to prevent its workers from
forming unions, which violated their freedom of association.159 More recently in
2012, Wal-Mart was also accused of supporting human trafficking and debt
bondage given that they source their shrimp from Thai fishing boats that have
been linked to the illicit activity. 6 '
152 Trivett, supra note 4.
153 See id.
54 See id.
155 ANITA CHAN, WALMART IN CHINA 4 (2011).
156 INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE LAW ANNUAL 282 (Fiona MacMilhian, ed., 2000).
157 "In the current global free-trade regime, there is no doubt that Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. is the most
significant corporate player." Ellen Israel Rosen, The Wal-Mart Effect: The World Trade OrganiZation
and the Race to the Bottom, 8 CHAP. L. REV. 261,261 (2005).
158 W. DAVIS FOLSOM, UNDERSTANDING AMERICAN BUSINESS JARGON: A DICTIONARY 330 (2d ed.
2005) (noting that the term "Wal-Mart effect" is not entirely negative but also refers to the
"broader effects such as helping to keep inflation low and productivity high").
159 U.S.: Wal-Mart Denies Workers Basic Rights, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (May 1, 2007), available at
http://www.hrw.org/news/ 2 007/04/30/us-wal-mart-deres-workers-basic-rights.
160 See John Sifton, Wal-Mart's Human Trafficking Problem, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Sept. 17, 2012),
available at http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/09/17/Wal-Marts-human-trafficking-problem.
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But because "Wal-Mart buys such a large quantity of items, it can purchase
them at a lower rate and then sell them at lower prices. ' .61 Moreover, "Wal-Mart
leads the pack in efficiency in how it warehouses and inventories products, and
employs some hardball tactics when dealing with suppliers." '162 Given Wal-Mart's
unmatched ability to deliver goods at low prices, the corporation is well
positioned to help minimize obesogenic price-related barriers to healthy foods
that affect poor populations.'63 Wal-Mart already seems to recognize that it is
well positioned to do so given certain public relations commitments it has
undertaken over the past few years. In 2008, through its "Commitment to You"
program, Wal-Mart promised to spend $400 million a year on local produce. 164
Then in 2011, Wal-Mart "committed to making food healthier, affordable and
accessible." 6 ' According to its website, it has allegedly already saved customers
approximately $1 billion per year on fresh fruits and vegetable "through a variety
of sourcing, pricing, and transportation and logistics initiatives that will drive
unnecessary costs out of the supply chain."
' 166
Wal-Mart recently announced that it would be opening 300 stores in 2016
in places that the USDA has identified as food deserts. 167 It complied with a
2011 commitment of opening approximately 9,000 stores, 219 of which were
opened in and around USDA-designated food deserts. 168 In light of these public
pronouncements together with the evidence that Wal-Mart has followed through
on these promises, this Comment will argue that international human rights law
should be understood as recognizing a continuing onus on the corporation to
help mitigate price-related, distributive barriers to healthful eating.
161 Larisa Epatko, How Local Businesses Coexist with Wal-Mart, PUBLIC BROADCASTING SERVICE (Aug.
20, 2004), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/business-july-dec04-ripple_08-20/.
162 Id
163 Healthier Food, WAI.MART, available at http:/ /corporate.walmart.com/global-responsibility/hunger-
nutrition/healthier-food.
164 JAMES E. MCWILLIAMSJUST FOOD 39 (2009).
165 Our Commitments, WAI MART, available at http://corporate.walmart.com/global-responsibiity/
hunger-nutrition/our-commitments.
166 Id.
167 Frederick E. Allen, Wal-Mart Leads the Way on Obesiy--in Both Directions, FoRBI:S (Jan. 20, 2011),
available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/frederickallen/2011/01/20/wal-mart- leads-the-way-on-
obesity-in-both-directions/. But see Charles Courtemanche & Art Carden, Supersizing Supercenters?
The Impact of Walmart Supercenters on Body Mass Index and Obesiy, 69 J. URB. ECON. 165, 165-81
(2011) (finding that when a Wal-Mart opens in a neighborhood, the average person gains 1.5
pounds over 10 years and 2.3/100 are obese).
168 Ivy Ken, Profit in the Food Desert: Walmart stakes its Claims, 7.4 THEORY IN ACTION 13, 21 (Oct.
2014).
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A. Focus on Price-Barriers to Healthy Foods
As Section III suggested, international trade liberalization has had
obesegenic effects. But it is also the case that trade liberalization has contributed
to the widening gap between the rich and the poor.169 This gap manifests in food
consumption patterns as well. A recent study in the Journal of the American Medical
Association argued that between 2005 and 2010, there was a doubling of the gap
in diet quality between the wealthiest and poorest Americans. 7 ' The study
attributed this doubling to higher costs of meals that are both convenient and
healthy as well as the problem of limited access to good supermarkets in poorer
neighborhoods (that is, the food desert problem).' 7
Ethical considerations as codified in international human rights treaties
demand that in the context of the obesity problem, primary efforts should be
directed at reducing distributive or access-issue causes. Article 12.1 of the
International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)
concerns the "right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable
standard of physical and mental health." '172 Put simply, if the price of nutritious
food is not affordable, then everyone does not enjoy the possibility of the
highest attainable standard of health. For a wealthy person who has access to
nutritious items, but has instead made unhealthy choices that have resulted in
obesity, his rights have not been violated since he enjoys the possibility of
achieving the highest attainable standard of health even if he choose not to. For
a poor person who is priced out of or has limited access to healthier choices, his
same right has arguably not been realized.
The United Nations in 2002 established the mandate of the Special
Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest
169 See Ahmad Yousuf Kurniawan, Seminar Paper, Trade IjberaliZation, Poverty and Income Inequality: An
Overview (Oct. 2012), available at http://www.academia.edu/5793363/Trade_Liberalization
_PovertyandIncomeInequalityAnOverview; Mattias Lundberg & Lyn Squire, Inequalio and
Growth, Lessonsfor Poligy, WORLD BANK, Ch. 3 (1999).
170 See Tracie McMillan, Gap in DietQualiky Between Wealthiest and Poorest Americans Doubles, Study Finds,
NAT. GEO. (Sept. 2, 2014), available at http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/
2014/09/140901 -american-diet-obesity-poor-food-health/.
171 See id.
172 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 12.1, Dec. 16, 1966, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 95-19, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://www.un-documents.net/icescr.htm
[hereinafter ICESCR].
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Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health.'73 The Special Rapporteur is
charged with monitoring compliance with the following standards in addition to
Article 12 of the ICESCR. Article 25.1 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR) states that "[e]veryone has the right to a standard of living
adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including
food." '174 The Constitution for the World Health Organization states that "[t]he
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental
rights of every human being without distinction of race, religion, political belief,
economic or social condition." ' Article 8 of the Declaration on the Right to
Development provides that "[s]tates should undertake, at the national level, all
necessary measures for the realization of the right to development and shall
ensure, inter alia, equality of opportunity for all in their access to basic resources,
education, health services, food, housing, employment and the fair distribution
of income." '176 These multi-fold international standards suggest that any solution
to the globesity problem should prioritize access barriers to healthy eating.
B. Corporate Social Responsibility and International Law: The
Wal-Mart Solution
As a starting point, it is clear that corporations enjoy legal rights under
international law. For example, as embodied in the above discussion regarding
multilateral trade agreements, corporations enjoy the right not to be
discriminated against in comparison to national firms. However, the extent of
their international legal responsibilities is less clear. Many scholars of corporate
social responsibility argue that the answer depends upon the idea of
"international legal personality."' 77 This concept "refers to the extent to which
an entity is recognized by the international legal system as having rights and
173 Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable
Standard of Physical and Mental Health, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Health/Pages/SRRightHealthlndex.aspx.
174 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg.,
U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
175 Constitution of the World Health Organization (1946), available at http://www.who.int/
governance/eb/who constitution_en.pdf.
176 Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128 art. 8, 41st Sess., 97th mtg., U.N.
Doc. A/RES/41/128 (Dec. 4, 1986).
177 Roda Mushkat, Corporate Social Reiponsibih/y, International Law, and Business Economics: Convergences and
Divergences, 12 OR. REV. INT'L L. 55, 57-58 (2010). See also JENNIFER A. ZERK, MULTINATIONALS
AND CORPORATE SOCIAl RESPONSIBILITY: LIMITATIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW (2006).
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responsibilities."' 78 The concept is "functional, and is influenced by the area of
regulation (and the role of the particular participant in it), the powers conferred
upon the 'person' and the aims and needs of the international community
overall." ' 9 Corporations do not possess every indication of international legal
personality since they lack qualities such as the ability to enter treaties and to
bring claims before certain international courts that require state status. 18
However, scholars have observed that there is a growing appreciation for the
role of non-state actors on the international stage that has been accompanied by
greater conviction that non-state actors such as companies "are also subject to
some direct obligations under international law."18 '
1. Negative and positive corporate duties under international law.
It is commonly accepted that corporations have negative duties to refrain
from violating human rights.'82 For instance, Article 30 of the UDHR states,
"Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group
or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the
destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein."' 83 However,
scholars have argued that international legal sources also recognize positive
duties for corporations. The preamble of the UDHR stipulates that "evey
individual and every organ of sodeoy, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind,
shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and
freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their
universal and effective recognition and observance."' 84 Professor Louis Henkin
has argued that the italicized words exclude no one, "no company, no market,
no cyberspace."' 185
Other provisions within the UDHR support Henkin's argument, such as
Article 29, which provides that "[e]vegyone has duties to the community in which
alone the free and full development of his personality is possible."' 86 Moreover,
178 See Z ERK, supra note 177, at 72.
179 Id. at 75.
180 See id.
181 Id.
182 See EIBE RIEDEI. ET AL., ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES AND CHALLENGES 198 (2014).
183 UDHR, supra note 174, at art. 30.
184 See id. at preamble (emphasis added).
185 Louis Henkin, The Global Market as a Friend or Foe of Human Rights: The Universal Declaration at 50
and the Challenge of GlobalMarkets, 25 BROOK.J INT'L L. 17, 25 (1999).
186 UDHR, supra note 174, at art. 29 (emphasis added).
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the U.N. Human Rights Norms for Corporations state that "[wlithin their
respective spheres of activity and influence, transnational corporations and other
business enterprises have the obligation to promote, secure the fulfillment of,
respect, ensure respect of and protect human rights recognized in international
as well as national law." ' The use of the word "promote" suggests a positive
duty to realize certain human rights rather than merely to refrain from
committing violations.
An objection one might raise to positive corporate duties is that the U.N.
Secretary-General's Special Representative on the issue of transnational
corporations and other business enterprises and human rights has specifically
made statements that appear to limit corporate responsibilities only to negative
ones. Namely he has said that "[w]hile corporations may be considered 'organs
of society,' they are specialized economic organs, not democratic public interest
institutions. As such their responsibilities cannot and should not simply mirror
the duties of States." 188
This Comment would respond to this counterpoint by first agreeing that
corporate responsibilities do not, nor should they, mirror those of the states
because of the very reasons the Special Representative addresses. As discussed
above, corporations do not possess all the indications of international legal
personality as do states. But it does not follow from this discrepancy that there
exist no circumstances giving rise to positive corporate responsibilities. While
the Special Representative says that the responsibility to respect "is the baseline
expectation for all companies in all situation," he goes even further and admits
that "[t]here are situations in which companies may have additional
responsibilities-for example, where they perform certain public functions, or
because they have undertaken additional commitments voluntarily."'89 While the
Special Representative does not elaborate on this point about voluntary
commitment, scholars should seize the moment to adopt and adapt this
language in discourse about the normative expectations of corporations.
187 Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises
with Regard to Human Rights, U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (Aug. 26, 2003).
188 Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Protect, Respect and Remedy: A
Framework for Business and Human Rights, Human Rights Council, 8th Sess. U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/8/5, at 53 (Apr. 7, 2008) (byJohn Rugge).
189 Id., 24 (emphasis added).
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2. Voluntary corporate commitments create international legal
obligations: scope and enforceability.
Given that international human rights standards would prioritize
addressing price barriers to healthy food in the context of obesity (as discussed
in Section VI.A), and given the evolving understanding of positive corporate
responsibilities (discussed in Section VI.B), this Comment posits the following:
by publicly committing to making food healthier, affordable, and accessible and
following through on that commitment, 19 Wal-Mart has arguably undertaken
what the Special Representative terms an "additional voluntary commitment." In
light of the Special Representative's admission that there are situations in which
corporations may assume additional responsibilities through voluntary
commitments, such voluntary commitment by Wal-Mart should be understood
to qualify as an exception to the general rule against positive corporate duties.
Given that the Special Representative has made such limited explicit
statements regarding voluntary corporate commitments, such an argument has
not been made before. While the WHO Global Strategy recommends that the
food industry "continue to develop and provide affordable, healthy and
nutritious choices to consumers," '191 it does not go as far as to argue that
international law may actually recognize a positive corporate duty to do so in
certain circumstances. Note that this Comment is not arguing that Wal-Mart is
legally obligated to open supercenters all over the world in poorer areas to
deliver healthier foods at low prices to poor populations. Even if one were to
think that the corporation should do so, a specific legal obligation to open stores
is not only non-existent but also potentially counter-productive since if taken to
the extreme could force the company to raise the price of the food it sells.
Rather, this Comment is suggesting that the discourse surrounding positive
corporate duties in international human rights law should be understood as
recognizing such a large and apt corporation's responsibilities to help mitigate
price-barriers to healthy food.
The closest analogous discourse surrounds the pharmaceutical industry's
obligations to address access-to-medicine issues under international human
rights law. The Special Rapporteur has issued Human Rights Guidelines for
Pharmaceutical Companies in Relation to Access to Medicines outlining
recommendations that call on pharmaceutical companies to take proactive steps
related to areas such as research, licensing, and pricing to help realize the right to
Vol. 16 No. 1
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health. 192 The pharmaceutical guidelines have a similar function to that of the
WHO Global Strategy in so far as they are unenforceable and compliance is
voluntary; however, the official commentary to the guidelines use uniquely
strong language related to mitigating pricing barriers and claims that "[b]ecause
the lives and health of millions are at stake, companies must approach such
arrangements with urgency, creativity and boldness."' 93 Guideline 5 specifically
states that "[w]henever formulating and implementing its strategies, policies,
programmes, projects and activities that bear upon access to medicines, the
company should give particular attention to the needs of disadvantaged
individuals, communities and populations." '194 The guidelines never explicitly
state that because a drug company may have voluntarily reduced the price of a
drug, it should be understood to have committed itself to continuing to do so
under evolving international human rights norms. Nonetheless, if a company is
supposed to give particular attention to the disadvantaged, it would implicitly be
compelled to do so under the language of the guidelines. So while not perfectly
analogous, similar discourse has been percolating around other health-related
distributive injustices outside of the context of food.
Recall from Section IV the discussion of the unenforceability of
international efforts to combat obesity both through the WHO Global Strategy
and the U.N. special procedure mandates. So even if the reader accepts the
argument that current human rights standards recognize Wal-Mart's duty to
mitigate price barriers to healthy food, the enforceability of this duty is so far
limited. However, the adamant focus by the Global Strategy and Special
Rapporteur on the right to health on the private sector's role in supplying
nutritious food only serves to reinforce and strengthen this developing
normative expectation of corporations. Given the rising prioritization of obesity
among policymakers worldwide, the WHO or Special Rapporteur could very
well release future reports on this theme that expand the scope of its
recommendations for the private sector. If such reports were to receive
publicity, it would help encourage and pressure large corporate food retailers to
commit, and then hopefully keep their commitments, to lowering the costs of
healthy food.
192 See P. Hunt, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the
Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, 63rd Sess., U.N. Doc. No. A/63/263
(Aug. 11, 2008), available at http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/human-rights/A63-263.pdf.
See also Joo-Young Lee & Paul Hunt, Human R'ghts Responsibilities of Pharmaceutical Companies in
Relation to Access to Medicines, 40 J.L. MED. & ETHIcs 220, 221 (2012).
193 Hunt, supra note 192, at Commentary to Pricing, Discounting, and Donations (emphasis added).
194 Hunt, supra note 192, at Guideline 5.
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Moreover, it should not be forgotten what an elephantine role Wal-Mart
plays in dictating world trade flows given how large of a corporation it is. As
such, even though Wal-Mart clearly is not nor can be a member of the WTO,
the global trade community should not miss this opportunity to discuss how
governments could utilize the corporation's competitive advantages to address
distributive injustices related to food.
VIII. CONCLUSION
International trade liberalization has contributed to the world's growing
obesity rate, and the laws that protect and perpetuate such liberalization can, in
certain instances, stand at odds with state efforts to address the public health
issue. Although the global trade system has created the problem, it has also
created a valuable solution: successful corporations that rival the wealth and
power of states. Given that Wal-Mart is wealthier than the majority of countries
in the world, it has the ability to do a great amount of public good, especially in
terms of improving diet.
Specifically, this Comment has argued that a solution to the obesity
problem lies in trying to address price-based barriers to nutritious food and that
Wal-Mart is a world player particularly well positioned to address this
distributive issue. Moreover, this Comment suggests that the discourse
surrounding positive corporate duties in international human rights law should
be understood as recognizing the corporation's responsibilities to help mitigate
these barriers given its voluntary commitments to doing so already.
This Comment does not pretend that eliminating price barriers to food
would eliminate obesity that is at least exacerbated by poverty. Consumer choice
will still always play a mediating role. Given people's hedonic preference for the
taste of sugar, fat, and salt, it is not necessarily the case that they will choose
spinach over cookies even if they are able to afford more healthy options. 9 '
However, individual choice is not the only factor contributing to the rise in
obesity, and given the prioritization of the access barriers to health in
international human rights law,"9' the steps that should be taken to reduce
factors contributing to the rise in obesity are those most tied to wealth disparity.
195 See Tomas Philipson & Richard Posner, The Long-Run Growth in Obesity as a Function of Technological
Change (John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics Working Paper No. 78, 1999), available at
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/fles/78.RPosner.Obesity.pdf ("If health is not everything in
life, rational people will eat more and exercise less than medical science advises them because they
prefer such behavior to better health and a longer life. In particular, people may prefer their high
paying sedentary jobs to more physically demanding ones with less pay.").
196 ICESCR, supra note 172, art. 12.1.
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